In recent years, a growing number of Christians who either explicitly identify as theonomists or who speak favorably of theonomy have quietly abandoned several of its core distinctives. While continuing to employ the language of Christian rule, biblical order, and national obedience to God, many have shifted away from God’s revealed law as the governing standard for civil government and have instead adopted a more natural law–oriented framework. This shift is especially evident within contemporary forms of Christian nationalism, particularly those influenced by the Stephen Wolfe variety of thought.
This shift away from theonomy and toward natural law arises from a perceived weakness in theonomy, a weakness many believe is remedied by adopting natural law as a supplemental framework. Specifically, the charge is that theonomy, standing on Scripture alone, is insufficient to regulate the civil order of a nation. Yet in attempting to correct this perceived deficiency, many have overcorrected. Civil authority is increasingly grounded in abstract notions of nature, prudence, tradition, and wisdom rather than in the concrete, revealed law of God. The result is not a recovery of biblical civil order, but a rebranded form of autonomous reasoning, now clothed in Christian language and defended with theological rhetoric.
What is frequently overlooked in these discussions is that this move represents a departure not only from Scripture, which alone is the ultimate and sufficient authority, but also from the clear teaching of the Protestant Reformers themselves. While the testimony of the Reformers is not determinative and is always subordinate to Scripture, it is nevertheless significant as historical confirmation of how the Bible was understood by those seeking to order both church and society according to God’s Word. Far from grounding civil authority in autonomous human wisdom or natural reason supplemented by prudence, the Reformers consistently affirmed that civil government is bound to govern according to God’s revealed law. Therefore, if any Reformer should be found to disagree with the argument presented here, such disagreement would not alter the conclusion, since Scripture itself must remain the final authority by which all theological claims are judged.
John Wycliffe wrote that “The Law of Christ, when perfectly executed, teaches most rightfully how every injustice must be extirpated from the commonwealth, and how those offending against the law should be chastised.” John Calvin insisted that “to discern that there is nothing but vanity in all worldly devices, we must know the Laws and ordinances of God. But if we rest upon men’s laws, surely it is not possible for us to judge rightly.” Ulrich Zwingli declared, “For He will that His Word alone be obeyed, and that the life be regulated by it alone.” Heinrich Bullinger affirmed that “Kings are not set as lords and rulers over the word and laws of God; but are, as subjects, to be judged of God by the word, as they that ought to rule and govern all things according to the rule of his word and commandment.” John Knox went so far as to deny any notion of autonomous royal authority, writing that “Kings then have not absolute power to do in their regiment what pleaseth them; but their power is limited by God’s Word…”
These statements reflect a shared conviction that civil authority is ministerial rather than legislative in the ultimate sense, and that rulers are constrained by God’s revealed law rather than human discretion. Although the Reformers did not employ the modern terminology of the regulative principle of government, the substance of that principle is unmistakable in their writings. Civil rulers were not understood to be free to act wherever Scripture is silent, but were bound to govern according to what God has spoken.
The purpose of this article is to argue that the contemporary drift away from key theonomic principles stems from a failure to apply consistently this Reformed understanding of authority, namely the distinction between the regulative principle and the normative principle. While Reformed Christians have historically been careful to apply this distinction to the doctrine of worship, many have failed to apply it to civil government. This inconsistency carries profound theological and practical consequences. By examining these two principles, their logical relationship, and their biblical foundations, it will be shown that civil government must operate under the regulative principle, and that abandoning this principle in favor of the normative principle inevitably results in a Christianized form of tyranny rather than genuine biblical government.
The Regulative and Normative Principles Defined
Before evaluating the application of these principles to civil government, they must be defined with precision. The regulative principle teaches that an institution may only do what God has explicitly authorized. The normative principle, by contrast, teaches that an institution may do anything that God has not explicitly forbidden. These principles are mutually exclusive and represent fundamentally different conceptions of authority.
Within the sphere of worship, the Reformed tradition has consistently affirmed the regulative principle. The church is not free to innovate, experiment, or appeal to pragmatism when determining how God is to be worshiped. Rather, it is bound to what God has commanded in Scripture. History has repeatedly demonstrated that departures from this principle lead to corruption, superstition, and the elevation of human tradition over divine authority.
Yet when this same distinction is applied to civil government, many Christians adopt a very different approach. Instead of insisting that the state is bound by what God has revealed, they assume that civil rulers may act wherever Scripture is silent. This is the normative principle applied to the state. Although this approach is often defended with appeals to wisdom, prudence, or natural law, it ultimately places lawmaking authority in the hands of fallible men rather than in the Word of God.
Jurisdiction and the Nature of Civil Authority
As we explain the regulative position, a common objection is often raised mockingly: “Since we can only do what the Bible says, where’s the Bible verse that says I need to tie my shoes?” This objection fails by confusing spheres of authority and the principles under which they operate.
The individual and the family operate under the normative principle. Scripture governs these spheres through moral obligation and wisdom rather than through a list of authorized actions. Fathers exercise real authority within the home, yet they are not required to have explicit biblical authorization for every household decision. In these spheres, what God has not forbidden is permitted, so long as actions conform to God’s moral law.
This pattern is established from the beginning. In the creation mandate, God commands man to exercise dominion, subdue the earth, and cultivate it (Genesis 1:26–30; 2:15). Scripture provides no procedural instructions for how this is to be carried out. Adam is given responsibility, not a regulatory code. The command assumes broad freedom of action bounded by obedience to God, not paralysis in the absence of explicit authorization. This alone makes clear that the regulative principle was never intended to govern ordinary human activity.
The Bible nowhere provides individuals with a catalog of permissions that must be consulted before acting. From the beginning, God established the pattern of normative freedom when He told Adam and Eve that they were free to eat from every tree of the garden except the tree of the knowledge of good and evil (Genesis 2:16–17). Believers are not instructed that they may only eat foods explicitly commanded, pursue vocations explicitly named, or labor in ways Scripture specifically authorizes. Instead, Scripture consistently assumes freedom bounded by moral law.
This same framework governs ordinary Christian living. Paul exhorts believers, “Whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God” (1 Corinthians 10:31). The command does not supply a list of authorized behaviors. Rather, it provides a moral orientation. Similarly, Scripture encourages initiative and diligence without prescribing methods: “Whatever your hand finds to do, do it with your might” (Ecclesiastes 9:10), and again, “In all toil there is profit” (Proverbs 14:23). The moral duty is clear, but the means are left to wisdom. This presupposes normative freedom, not regulative restriction.
The family operates under this same normative framework. Fathers are commanded to raise their children faithfully, but they are not given an exhaustive manual prescribing every method, schedule, or technique. Scripture instructs, “Fathers, do not provoke your children to anger, but bring them up in the discipline and instruction of the Lord” (Ephesians 6:4). The goal and moral boundaries are clearly defined, but the means are left to godly discretion. Proverbs likewise commands, “Train up a child in the way he should go” (Proverbs 22:6), without legislating how that training must occur. If the regulative principle governed the family, fathers would be unable to act unless Scripture explicitly authorized each parental decision. Instead, Scripture grants real authority bounded by moral law and exercised through wisdom.
The book of Proverbs consistently reinforces this pattern by commending prudence, foresight, planning, diligence, and household management (Proverbs 6:6–8; 14:15; 21:5), while never supplying a household law code. Proverbs 31 praises a woman who buys fields, plants vineyards, trades goods, manages servants, and plans for future seasons, all without prior authorization. The reason is clear: the family is a relational authority, not a public, coercive institution. Its authority operates normatively, not legislatively.
Scripture also explicitly warns against importing institutional regulation into personal and household life. Paul rebukes those who impose man-made rules on believers, writing, “Why do you submit to regulations—‘Do not handle, Do not taste, Do not touch’—according to human precepts and teachings?” (Colossians 2:20–22). Likewise, he condemns those who forbid foods God created to be received with thanksgiving (1 Timothy 4:3–5). The problem in these passages is not disobedience, but the imposition of regulatory authority where God has not legislated. Such regulation is treated as error, not piety.
The church and the civil government, by contrast, are institutional authorities established by God with defined jurisdictions and public accountability. Their authority is not personal or discretionary, but formal and representative. Because they act in God’s name and bind others through official judgments, including discipline and coercion, they are restricted to what God has authorized. The regulative principle does not deny the use of wisdom in these spheres, but it denies the legitimacy of inventing laws, crimes, or punishments that God has not revealed.
The decisive distinction is that the regulative principle exists to restrain coercive, representative authority. Individuals do not wield the sword. Families do not bind society. Fathers do not define crimes or administer public penalties. Because individuals and families do not exercise universal jurisdiction or coercive power, Scripture governs them through moral law and wisdom rather than authorization lists. Applying the regulative principle to private life destroys Christian liberty, while applying the normative principle to the state destroys justice. Scripture carefully avoids both errors.
The Logical Relationship Between the Two Principles
The regulative and normative principles are not complementary options. They are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. In formal logic, this relationship is known as a disjunctive syllogism.
A disjunctive syllogism presents two mutually exclusive options, with no third possibility. For example, either a woman is pregnant or she is not pregnant. If it is true that she is pregnant, then the “not pregnant” option is automatically false. Conversely, if it is true that she is not pregnant, then the “pregnant” option is falsified. There is no third category.
The same structure applies to governing principles. Either an institution operates under the regulative principle or it operates under the normative principle. There is no hybrid position and no neutral middle ground. Once one principle is affirmed, the other is denied by definition.
Applied to civil government, the logic is straightforward. Either civil government operates under the regulative principle or it operates under the normative principle. If civil government operates under the regulative principle, then it does not operate under the normative principle. Logic itself demands this conclusion. One does not need to refute both positions independently. Demonstrating the necessity of the regulative principle automatically excludes the normative principle.
Biblical Foundations for the Regulative Principle of Government
Scripture explicitly restricts civil rulers from acting beyond what God has commanded. Nowhere is this clearer than in God’s law concerning kings. In Deuteronomy 17:18–20, the king is required to write a copy of God’s law, read it continually, and govern in such a way that he “may not turn aside from the commandment to the right hand or to the left.” This language does not permit discretionary authority wherever Scripture is silent. Rather, it explicitly forbids deviation beyond what God has revealed. The king is not a co-lawgiver, nor is he authorized to supplement God’s law with prudential legislation. He is bound, personally and institutionally, to administer what God has spoken. This passage alone decisively undermines the normative principle of government and establishes the regulative principle as the biblical standard for civil authority.
This restriction is grounded in Scripture’s broader doctrine of authority. Civil authority is consistently presented as derivative and limited rather than autonomous. Romans 13 describes the magistrate as a servant of God tasked with punishing evil and rewarding good, but the passage assumes a prior definition of good and evil and never grants the magistrate authority to define them independently. Likewise, Isaiah 33:22 identifies the Lord as judge, lawgiver, and king. Civil rulers may participate in judgment, but they do not replace God as lawgiver. The authority to define justice belongs to God alone, and civil authority operates ministerially under that prior determination.
The prohibition against adding to or subtracting from God’s law further clarifies the nature of legitimate authority. In Deuteronomy 4:2 and Deuteronomy 12:32, Israel is commanded not to add to what God has spoken or take away from it. These commands govern Israel’s covenantal life as a nation and therefore apply to those who exercise authority within it. The prohibition assumes that God’s law is complete and sufficient and that human authority does not include the right to supplement it. When kings later assume national leadership, this restriction does not lapse or weaken. Centralized authority does not create new jurisdiction, and rulers are no more permitted to add law than the people themselves.
At the establishment of the monarchy, royal authority is formally defined and bounded. In 1 Samuel 10:25, Samuel sets forth “the behavior of royalty,” writes it in a book, and lays it up before the Lord. Kingship is not improvised or left open-ended but is regulated by a written standard external to the king himself. The law governing royal behavior is deposited before God, not entrusted to royal discretion. This arrangement presupposes that kings do not determine the scope of their own authority but receive it as something already defined and constrained.
This limitation is reinforced when Samuel later addresses both ruler and people together. In 1 Samuel 12:14–15, obedience to the voice of the Lord is required of the nation and of the king alike. Kingship does not place the ruler above the covenant or grant him interpretive or legislative autonomy. Obedience is measured by conformity to what God has spoken, not by appeals to abstract justice, prudence, or political necessity. Disobedience brings covenantal sanction, demonstrating that royal authority is accountable to a fixed, revealed standard rather than discretionary judgment.
David’s instruction to Solomon further clarifies the nature of faithful kingship. In 1 Kings 2:3–4, Solomon is charged to keep the statutes, commandments, judgments, and testimonies of the Lord “as it is written in the Law of Moses.” There is no appeal to wisdom apart from revelation and no authorization to expand legal categories beyond what has been given. Royal success and legitimacy are explicitly tied to obedience to written law. Kingship is portrayed as the faithful administration of an existing legal order, not the creation of new law.
The same principle governs God’s promise to Jeroboam. In 1 Kings 11:38, the establishment of his dynasty is conditioned on obedience to all that God commands and on walking in God’s ways. Authority is not grounded in political competence or prudential governance but in submission to divine instruction. Jeroboam’s subsequent failure underscores this point by demonstrating that legitimacy collapses when obedience is replaced by innovation.
Jeroboam’s failure makes the regulative nature of kingship unmistakable. In 1 Kings 12:28–33, he invents feast days, appoints unauthorized priests, and establishes alternative worship centers. Scripture condemns him not for rejecting Yahweh outright, but for the sin “which he had devised in his own heart.” The offense is unauthorized innovation. His actions are treated as covenantal rebellion precisely because they lack divine authorization. Innovation itself is the crime, demonstrating that kings are judged not only for violating God’s commands but for inventing practices God did not institute.
This pattern of accountability is consistent throughout Scripture. Saul lost his kingdom not for rejecting God outright, but for modifying God’s commands. Uzziah was struck with leprosy for assuming authority God had not granted him. In each case, rulers are judged not for incompetence or bad intentions, but for exceeding the bounds of their God-given authority. Unauthorized authority, even when religiously justified, is treated by God as rebellion.
Josiah’s reform provides a positive contrast. In 2 Kings 22–23, national reformation begins not with new legislation or appeals to natural law or prudence, but with the rediscovery of God’s written law. Reform consists in bringing the nation back into conformity with revelation already given. Authority is exercised through repentance and obedience rather than creative governance. The episode presupposes that legitimate civil norms already existed in Scripture and that faithfulness consists in recovering and enforcing them.
Finally, the prophets explicitly condemn legislative activity that departs from God’s standards. In Isaiah 10:1–2, woe is pronounced upon those who “decree unrighteous decrees” and write oppressive laws. The condemnation is directed not merely at unjust enforcement, but at the act of lawmaking itself when it produces standards contrary to God’s law. This presupposes that justice is already fully defined by divine revelation and that human lawmaking beyond what God has revealed is not regulation but rebellion. Civil rulers are therefore judged not only by how they enforce law, but by whether they have the authority to issue the decrees they impose.
What It Means for Government to “Reward Good”
A common objection to the regulative principle appeals to the claim that civil government must not only punish evil but also reward good. Romans 13 and 1 Peter 2 speak of rulers approving and praising those who do good, and from these passages many conclude that government is authorized, and even obligated, to engage in expansive positive action beyond the administration of justice.
This conclusion, however, rests on a misreading of the relevant texts. In Romans 13:3–4, Paul describes rulers as “not a terror to good conduct, but to bad,” and states that those who do good will receive approval. Likewise, 1 Peter 2:14 speaks of governors as sent “to punish those who do evil and to praise those who do good.” In both cases, the contrast is judicial, not programmatic. The text sets punishment and praise in direct opposition, indicating that “rewarding good” is defined in relation to the absence of punishment and the presence of legal protection, not the active manufacture of virtue or material benefit.
Scripture does not portray civil rulers as moral engineers tasked with producing goodness in society. Rather, the magistrate’s role is fundamentally negative and protective. He restrains evil so that good may exist unhindered. In this sense, government rewards good primarily by refusing to treat it as evil, by acquitting the righteous, and by shielding lawful conduct from coercive interference. The “reward” is public recognition of innocence, legal vindication, and the freedom to live peaceably without fear of unjust penalty.
This reading is reinforced by the broader biblical pattern of blessing and curse. Throughout Scripture, obedience is often rewarded not by added privileges imposed from above, but by peace, safety, and freedom from oppression. When the wicked are restrained and punished, the righteous naturally benefit. This is the ordinary means by which civil justice produces social good.
Because the state’s unique power is coercion exercised over the entire population, its positive actions must be narrowly defined and carefully limited. When government attempts to “reward good” through force, taxation, or regulatory compulsion, it necessarily moves beyond justice and into control. What begins as praise quickly becomes management, and management becomes domination. Scripture authorizes government to uphold justice, protect the innocent, acquit the righteous, and punish the guilty. These functions are neither minimal nor insufficient. They are precisely suited to the nature of civil authority and sufficient for the preservation of public order.
Properly understood, the biblical command for government to reward good does not support expansive state action. It reinforces the regulative principle by defining civil reward in terms consistent with God’s revealed law and the limited jurisdiction He has assigned to the magistrate.
Clarifying the “Bible Verse for Everything” Objection
As we explain the regulative position, a common objection is usually raised mockingly: “Since we can only do what the Bible says, where’s the Bible verse that says I need to tie my shoes?” This objection fails by confusing spheres of authority and the principles under which they operate.
The individual and the family operate under the normative principle. Fathers exercise real authority within the home, yet they are not required to have explicit biblical authorization for every household decision. In these spheres, what God has not forbidden is permitted.
The church and the civil government, however, are institutional authorities established by God with defined jurisdictions and public accountability. Their authority is not personal or discretionary, but formal and representative. Because they act in God’s name and bind others through official judgments, they are restricted to what God has authorized. The regulative principle does not deny the use of wisdom; it denies the legitimacy of inventing laws, crimes, or punishments that God has not revealed.
The Normative Principle and the Problem of Tyranny
When the normative principle is applied to civil government, tyranny becomes inevitable. If rulers may act wherever Scripture is silent, silence itself becomes authorization. Under such a framework, the absence of prohibition is treated as permission, and the scope of governmental power expands by default rather than by divine warrant. New crimes can be created, penalties can be increased, and regulatory authority can grow without any principled limitation.
Appeals to prudence or wisdom do not restrain this expansion of power, because those concepts are defined and applied by the rulers themselves. When wisdom is detached from God’s revealed law, it becomes indistinguishable from personal preference or political expediency. Autonomous reasoning inevitably replaces divine law, regardless of whether the rhetoric used is secular or Christian, and the result is a state that increasingly governs by discretion rather than by justice.
A Contemporary Case Study: Civil Authority During the COVID Lockdowns
The confusion surrounding the regulative and normative principles was made especially visible during the COVID lockdowns. At that time, many Christian leaders were suddenly forced to answer a question they had not carefully considered: what are the actual limits of civil authority? In the absence of a principled framework, many defaulted to a simplistic rule that Christians must obey the government unless the government commands them to sin.
This line of reasoning was commonly used to justify government-mandated mask wearing. The argument was straightforward: wearing a mask is not sinful; therefore, the government has the right to mandate it. Because no direct command to sin was involved, obedience was framed as morally required, and resistance was treated as unnecessary or even rebellious.
This reasoning exposes a fundamental misunderstanding of authority. It assumes that the government possesses a general, open-ended right to command whatever it wishes, provided the command does not explicitly contradict a biblical prohibition. In other words, it assumes the normative principle of government.
A regulative understanding of civil authority exposes the error immediately. The proper question is not whether the command itself is sinful, but whether God has granted the government authority to issue such a command at all. Wearing a mask may not be sinful, but that does not automatically mean the government has the authority to mandate it. The morality of an action and the legitimacy of a command are distinct questions.
Had Christians been operating with a regulative framework during the lockdowns, the response would not have been, “This command is sinful,” but rather, “God has not granted the civil magistrate authority to regulate the ordinary bodily practices of law-abiding citizens absent a defined crime or judicial process.” The issue was not merely whether believers were being commanded to sin, but whether the state was acting outside the bounds of its God-given jurisdiction.
This also explains why appeals to Romans 13 were so often misapplied during that period. Romans 13 teaches that the magistrate is God’s servant for the punishment of evil and the protection of good. It does not grant the magistrate authority to suspend worship, regulate the sacraments, or impose sweeping behavioral mandates on entire populations. When the government moved into these areas, it was not exercising lawful authority imperfectly; it was exercising authority it did not possess.
The Regulative Principle and Non-Legislative Theonomy
The regulative principle aligns directly with non-legislative theonomy. Civil government is not authorized to create new law, but is tasked with enforcing the law God has already revealed. Crimes, punishments, and jurisdiction are defined by God, not by human judgment or cultural consensus.
Under this framework, civil rulers function as ministers of justice rather than authors of morality. Their authority is exercised not through creative lawmaking but through judicial application. Judges adjudicate cases by applying God’s revealed law to concrete circumstances placed before them. They do not legislate new standards of righteousness, nor do they invent new categories of criminal behavior based on perceived social needs or pragmatic concerns. This judicial, rather than legislative, function defines the proper operation of civil authority. This is the true meaning of general equity. General equity is the application of the underlying moral principle of God’s law to concrete situations, not the creation of new laws based on human reasoning alongside the law God has already revealed.
This distinction can be clarified by distinguishing adjudication from legislation. Adjudication involves the application of God’s revealed law to concrete circumstances, whereas legislation involves the creation of new binding norms. Scripture provides a clear illustration of this distinction in the case of Solomon and the two women who claimed the same child (1 Kings 3:16–28). Before Solomon ever renders judgment, he asks God for “a listening heart to judge Your people, to discern between good and evil,” and Scripture explicitly states that this request “was pleasing in the sight of the LORD” (1 Kings 3:9–10). God’s approval is directed not toward legislative creativity, but toward faithful judicial discernment. Solomon asks to be a judge, not a lawgiver. When the case is brought before him, Solomon employs wisdom to discern the truth in a difficult situation, yet he issues no new law, establishes no precedent-binding statute, and announces no general rule for future cases. If the normative principle were correct, this would have been the ideal moment for Solomon to legislate, declaring a standing rule for all similar disputes. Instead, he confines himself to rendering judgment in the case before him, applying what he already knows of justice to the facts at hand. The narrative concludes by confirming this role, as “all Israel heard of the judgment which the king had rendered, and they feared the king, for they saw that the wisdom of God was in him to do justice” (1 Kings 3:28). Wisdom is recognized not in the creation of new law, but in the faithful administration of justice. The episode demonstrates that biblical wisdom in civil authority operates judicially rather than legislatively. Solomon’s authority is exercised in faithful adjudication, not creative lawmaking, reinforcing that general equity is the application of God’s law, not the invention of new law.
Natural Law and Christianized Autonomy
Natural law advocates would never openly admit that Scripture alone is insufficient to govern society. Yet by insisting that additional legislation, prudential reasoning, or extra-biblical norms are necessary for civil governance, they demonstrate that they do not truly believe Scripture alone is sufficient for governing society.
Natural law advocates typically affirm biblical law while denying its sufficiency for civil government. When Scripture is treated as incomplete, something else must fill the gap. That replacement is always human wisdom. Autonomy does not disappear, it is merely clothed in Christian language. Government overreach justified by appeals to prudence remains overreach, even when it is baptized with theological terminology. Tyranny does not become righteous because it quotes Scripture.
The Objection of Idealism
A common objection to the regulative principle is that it is too idealistic for present political realities. While the principle may describe how civil government ought to function, it is argued that modern states already operate through legislatures and systems of positive law. Since these structures exist, Christians are told that faithfulness requires working within them by pursuing legislation that approximates biblical justice.
This objection confuses the reality of an unjust system with the legitimacy of that system. Scripture does not teach that authority becomes lawful simply because it exists, nor does it redefine obedience to accommodate prevailing political arrangements. The regulative principle does not deny the complexity of present circumstances, but it refuses to redefine righteousness in order to accommodate them. Scripture calls rulers to repentance, not merely to improved policy, and it calls God’s people to bear witness to His law even when existing institutions fall short of it.
This framework does not require Christians to withdraw from civic life or adopt passivity. Scripture presents faithful men operating within compromised political orders without affirming those orders as just. Joseph served in Egypt, Daniel served in Babylon, and the prophets confronted kings within Israel’s own corrupted structures. Participation in such contexts did not imply moral endorsement. The issue is not action versus inaction, but witness versus authorization.
This distinction is especially important when considering voting and legislative activity. Old Testament kings were judged for instituting unauthorized laws because they exercised divinely defined office and claimed jurisdiction they had not been given. They authored binding norms and enforced them through coercive power in God’s name. Voting, by contrast, is not the exercise of civil authority. A voter does not define crimes, establish penalties, bind consciences, or wield the sword. Voting is an act of petition and testimony within an already corrupted system, not an act of rule.
For this reason, voting to restrain evil is not morally equivalent to unauthorized lawmaking. When Christians oppose abortion through lawful means, they are not declaring that the legislature has rightful authority to define murder, nor are they claiming that legislative compromise constitutes justice. Abortion does not require legislation to become murder; it is already murder under God’s law. Measures that restrict bloodshed may be supported as restraints on evil, but they must not be treated as obedience to God’s law or as evidence that legislative authority itself is legitimate.
The regulative principle therefore calls Christians to clarity rather than quietism. Christians may act, vote, speak, and advocate within the nations they inhabit, but they must do so as witnesses to God’s law rather than as defenders of unauthorized authority. Faithfulness consists not in baptizing illegitimate power because it restrains evil, but in opposing evil while refusing to grant man the authority to replace God as lawgiver.
Conclusion
Civil government cannot operate without a governing principle. Either it is bound by what God has authorized, or it is free to act wherever God has not forbidden. These are the only two options, and Scripture allows no middle ground.
If the regulative principle is affirmed, the normative principle is necessarily excluded. Civil authority is constrained, ministerial, and accountable to God’s revealed law. Rulers govern as servants, not as legislators of morality, and justice is administered rather than invented. But if the normative principle is adopted, tyranny inevitably follows. When silence is treated as permission, human discretion becomes law, and power expands by default rather than by divine warrant. Appeals to prudence, wisdom, or necessity cannot restrain this expansion, because those concepts are defined by the rulers themselves once God’s law is no longer treated as sufficient.
A truly Christian view of civil government must therefore reject autonomous reasoning in all its forms, whether openly secular or subtly baptized with Christian language. To abandon the regulative principle is not merely to adjust one’s political theology, but to replace God as lawgiver with man. Any alternative, no matter how Christian it appears in rhetoric or intention, ultimately substitutes divine authority with human judgment and trades biblical government for a Christianized form of tyranny.









