In a recent article, Nolan Corcoran maintains that “the political theories advanced by R. J. Rushdoony and Greg Bahnsen (representing Christian Reconstructionism) align significantly with Stephen Wolfe’s articulation of Christian Nationalism, particularly in their understanding of civil law, natural law, and the role of Scripture in political theory.” Corcoran contends that there is “substantial agreement” not just in the “foundational principles,” but also in the “practical applications” between Christian Reconstructionism and Christian Nationalism. His essay attempts to minimize the differences between Christian Reconstructionism and Christian Nationalism and highlight what unites the two movements. He closes his treatise by noting that “any division between these movements is overstated and counterproductive.” The differences, Corcoran argues, are “minor methodological differences:”
I commend Corcoran’s desire for a broad Christian ecumenicalism that rejects secular neutrality. I embrace my Christian brothers who disagree with me as Christian brothers. At the same time, I think the church at large needs to think deeply about the biblical injunction to “do justice” (Micah 6:8). It behooves us, therefore, to avoid minimizing methodological and theological differences that relate to matters of justice. These are weighty matters (Matt. 23:23), and we ought to take them seriously and pray that our interactions will lead to iron sharpening iron (Prov. 27:17). If we are brothers-in-arms, fighting in the Lord’s army, as it were, then we should welcome ardent and passionate debate regarding the way forward. Oftentimes, understanding the fundamental disagreements is the first step towards edifying discourse.
My argument is that if Corcoran’s understanding of the modern conception of Christian Reconstructionism is accurate, and if that conception is indeed fundamentally aligned with Wolfe’s articulation of Christian Nationalism, as Corcoran asserts, then Christian Reconstructionism needs to undergo further reformation to better align with Scripture.
Concerning theonomists, I believe Corcoran is correct when he argues that modern-day proponents of “general equity theonomy” and many who claim to hold to “classical theonomy” do not differ substantively “in their conception of Biblical Law and its application.” But my contribution to the discussion is as follows: If Corcoran is correct, it is because both groups (“general equity theonomists” and “classical theonomists”) are arguing for man-made legislation. Furthermore, if most modern-day theonomists/Christian Reconstructionists are at peace with man-made legislation, Corcoran’s conclusion does indeed follow – namely, there is no substantial difference between modern-day theonomists and Christian nationalists. If both groups uphold man-made legislation as legitimate, the differences that remain are indeed “minor methodological differences.” However, I contend that Bible-believing Christian Reconstructionists (and all Christians, for that matter) ought to reject man-made legislation. In that case, there would be substantive differences between Christian Reconstructionism (theonomy) and Christian Nationalism.
Growth and Development
I believe our great-grandchildren’s generation will take the application of God’s Word and the advancement of Christ’s kingdom farther than our generation has. As the church grows and expands, the body of Christ develops and matures (see Eph. 4:13-16; 1 Cor. 14:20; Heb. 6:1-3; cf. 1 Cor. 6:2). It is necessary that Christendom further develop the valuable work of the theonomists of the last generation (e.g., Bahnsen, North, Rushdoony, etc.). There are likely areas where they got things wrong and/or failed to develop fully. Specifically, the supposed legitimacy of the legislative branch – tacitly assumed in the post-war/post-constitution consensus (even among theonomists) – must be taken up by the next generation of Christians.
I am not the gatekeeper in terms of what passes for the bona fide “Christian Reconstruction” position. My goal is to faithfully understand and apply the Bible. The works of Bahnsen and Rushdoony stand on their own, and I spend little time attempting to prove that their “Christian Reconstructionism” is equivalent to what I espouse. However, if I can allow myself a moment of boldness, I will admit that I believe the core of Bahnsen’s position (in particular), if taken to its logical conclusion, would be consistent with non-legislative theonomy.
For example, Bahnsen wrote: “Any conception of the role of civil government that claims to be distinctively Christian must be explicitly justified by the teaching of God’s revealed Word.” My contention is that God’s revealed Word does not justify man creating legislation. Moreover, Bahnsen argued that all “political leaders are ethically obligated to enforce those civil provisions in the moral law of God – and only those provisions – where He has delegated coercive power of enforcement to rulers.” This is consistent with the position I argue below –namely, magistrates should be rendering judgments in accord with the “civil provisions in the moral law of God,” not creating new civil provisions to be inscripurated in human lawbooks. However, instead of spending time trying to claim the name “Christian Reconstructionist” (a label I am comfortable wearing, in any case), I have tended to adopt the moniker of “non-legislative theomony” or “Lancastrian theonomy” in my writing. The reason for this is not due to a desire for novelty, but for the sake of clarity.
Non-Legislative (or Lancastrian) Theonomy
Terms are helpful in discourse if all parties agree on the definitions of said terms. The ultimate question comes down to this: What does the Bible teach? (At least it should come down to that.) But for the sake of shorthand, we use terms and phrases. For example, we use the term “Trinity” to refer to what the Bible teaches about the nature and being of God. Instead of saying “the Bible’s teaching on the fact that there is one God in three persons,” we might say, “Trinitarian theology.” In a similar fashion, I use the phrase “non-legislative theonomy” or “Lancastrian theonomy” to refer to what I believe the Bible teaches about civil justice, law, and the civil magistrate.
I contend that the difference between what the Bible teaches (i.e., non-legislative theonomy) and Corcoran’s coalescence (legitimate or otherwise) of Christian Reconstruction and Christian Nationalism is substantial. These two positions do not “converge on practical applications, including the role of civil magistrates.” In what follows, I will demonstrate this. Once again, this is not necessarily a critique of Corcoran’s analysis of the majority of modern-day proponents of theonomy; it is an articulation of the position that people in both groups ought to consider with more earnestness – namely, non-legislative theonomy. (Further references to theonomy below might assume the “non-legislative” prefix, as I believe this is the accurate understanding of God’s law.)
Defining Terms: Legislation Is Not the Same as Adjudication
It is imperative, for the sake of intelligible discourse, that we establish the fundamental difference between legislation and adjudication. Legislation establishes the standard for justice. Adjudication appeals to the standard of justice and then results in a formal judgment on a specific dispute. Theonomists do not posit that legislation is unnecessary; rather, we assert that God’s legislation, as revealed in the Bible, is a sufficient standard for establishing justice in society (cf. Deut. 4:2). As I explain elsewhere, this assertion does not mean we think the Bible gives us all the information we need to establish justice, but it does give us all the legislation we need to establish justice. In the biblical system, a judge can consider a case (and thus gather new information) and establish justice by giving a ruling based on God’s legislation (in the Bible), he need not refer to legislation created by self-serving politicians thirty years ago.
In Scripture, we see that God’s legislation is not to be added to, and yet adjudication was not only acceptable but required. The principle of not creating new laws but adjudicating cases is at the heart of the biblical presentation of justice. For example, in Exodus 18:13-26, we see Moses adjudicating disputes among the people, applying God’s legislation to specific cases. Furthermore, Deuteronomy 16:18-20 relates how the Israelites were to appoint judges and officers in every town, not to create new laws, but to judge the people with righteous judgment, not showing partiality or taking bribes when considering the cases brought before them. Adjudication is essential to maintaining justice in society, as it allows for the application of God’s revealed Law-Word to new and varied situations. If God had wanted people to constantly be creating new laws, I submit that he would have established that system (the legislative branch), rather than the system of adjudication we see in the pages of sacred Scripture.
In Deuteronomy 1:17 the magistrates are charged to “not be partial in judgment” and to “hear the small and the great alike.” This is opposed to the modern conception of legislation, which preemptively issues “rulings” and “pre-adjudications” (i.e. legislation) against people. The “small” (e.g., economically weak) are the last to get a hearing in our modern system. The wealthy can afford the lawsuits and red tape that plague our system of man-made legislation. The human legislator views his role as ordering society, preemptively dictating human affairs and authorizing punishment (fines, etc.) absent adjudication based on God’s law. The biblical magistrate, on the other hand, knows that his duty is to “give justice to the weak and the fatherless” (Ps. 82:3).
The idea that the magistrate’s role is to judge (adjudicate) based on God’s legislation is perspicuous in Scripture. The abovementioned passages provide only a small sampling. The overall concept of the magistrate’s duty to appeal to the standard of God’s legislation in adjudication is summarized by Bahnsen in the following quotations (all from Theonomy in Christian Ethics; emphasis added):
[T]he civil magistrate and judge…are to judge the people by means of God’s righteous law. (p. 322)
God is a “lawgiver” (Isa. 33:22), and His law is the standard of righteousness and judgment for men. (p. 322)
Now then, if God is the great Judge, if it is His judgment which is righteous and His law which defines justice, then by placing the civil magistrate and judge under obligation to carry out His commandments in the nation God constitutes them His deputies upon earth. (p. 323)
[T]he magistrate or judge must enforce the law of God. (p. 323)
In carrying out the penal sanctions of God’s law the magistrate is “God’s image” (cf. Gen. 9:5-6), for his judgment reflects that of the Lord. (p. 323)
The judges over the people had to rule according to the statutes of God’s law (Ex. 18:20-22), and only when such judges are restored in Jerusalem will it be truly a “city of righteousness” (Isa. 1:21-26). (p. 324).
[I]t is quite evident that [rulers] were required to follow the law of God, for therein the ruler could find authoritative direction from his Sovereign, the occasions of God’s wrath, the proper way of executing punishment for social disobedience, and the criteria of good and evil. (p. 325)
The magistrate was required to judge righteously, which must mean according to God’s law since justice is perverted when the law is slackened (Hab. 1:4). (p. 326)
The judges would be unable to [establish justice] if the standard of righteousness were not known from the law of God. To command them to judge righteously is tantamount to requiring them to judge according to the law: “And in a controversy they shall stand to judge; according to mine ordinances shall they judge it: and they shall keep my laws and my statutes…” (Eze. 44:24). (p. 326)
[In Proverbs] we learn the foundation, task, and indispensable ingredient of civil government; they are, respectively, God, then the enforcement of God’s law, and consequently, godly rulers. (p. 327)
[T]he duty of the king could be summarized as “judge righteously and minister justice” (Prov. 31:9). (p. 328)
God’s law must be enforced as the law of the land. (p. 377-378)
[God’s] judgment awaits those officials who turn aside from ruling according to the just standards established by the Lord. (p. 379-380)
Not only were public officials to obey the law of God, but it is clear that even the sanctions of the law were to be observed. (p. 381)
(I admit that Bahnsen may not have fully applied and/or developed the import of all these points – which I think should have led him to affirm what I call non-legislative theonomy. However, my point here is simply to explain the biblical role of the magistrate – namely, adjudicating based on God’s revealed standard. Bahnsen’s quotes said it better than I could.)
What is important to note is that a law is a standard that is appealed to as authoritative. In Christian theology, sin is a violation of God’s law (cf. 1 John 3:4), which serves as the ultimate standard. Biblical justice, similarly, posits God’s legislation as the standard for justice; thus, there is not a need for new legislation. In our modern system, justice is defined as adherence to man’s legislation. Adjudication follows legislation, and in our system, man appeals to man’s legislation in adjudication. This is a fatal flaw. In the Christian system, judges (kings/rulers) appeal to God’s legislation in adjudication. This is a fundamental and substantive difference. Christian Nationalists promoting man-made legislation are not “basically saying the same thing” as theonomists arguing for God’s legislation as the standard of justice in adjudication.
The practical consequence of embracing man-made legislation as the standard of justice can be seen daily in courtrooms across the nation. Judges consistently remind people that their job is to simply determine if the (human) law was followed or not. Such a system leads to the righteous being punished, not for violating God’s legislation or committing injustice, but for failing to follow the latest law made by a group of legislators who will be forgotten in a few years (cf. Prov. 17:26). In such cases, biblical justice “never goes forth” as “the wicked surround the righteous [and] justice goes forth perverted” (Hab. 1:4).
If the definitions of legislation and adjudication are conflated, profitable discussion regarding justice will be stymied.
General Equity: Great for Adjudication, Bad for Legislation
Corcoran gets closest to the target when he writes, “Biblical Law does not consist merely of rigid, universally applicable civil codes but operates through case law principles. Case law constitutes the use of particular instances of civil legislation, proceedings and/or rulings to establish an underlying ‘precedent’ (i.e. ‘general equity’) for use in future cases with different particularities.” Concerning charges of wooden literalism, Corcoran is correct to defend Bahnsen and other theonomists who have “been subject to endless caricatures.” In my book Seven Statist Sins I wrote the following:
A common critique of a specifically theonomic application of God’s law is that theonomists argue for a woodenly literal, direct application of every law in the Bible to modern society, without considering cultural differences, changes in redemptive history, or unique commands for a specific geo-political people. Greg Bahnsen, considered by many to be one of the clearest articulators of the theonomic position, resented that critique: “Furthermore, it should be perfectly plain to any student of Scripture, theonomic or not, that God requires obedience to the underlying principles illustrated by Scripture’s cultural expressions.”
Corcoran argues that theonomy does not advocate for a universal application of the Mosaic Law’s particular determinations, but rather for the general equity of Mosaic Law. Bahnsen provides further elucidation:
Theonomy [Bahnsen’s book] plainly observed: “the case law illustrates the application or qualification of the principle laid down in the general commandments,” and it is “the underlying principle (of which the case law was a particular illustration)” which “has abiding ethical validity.” We are not bound to the cultural details of flying axheads and rooftop railings, but to the principles about unpremeditated homicide and safety precautions, etc. Those who have ridiculed the theonomic position for requiring observance of ancient cultural details should give responsible reflection to their ill-conceived criticism. Such disdain would equally ridicule New Testament ethical directives with their cultural trappings as though “Go and do likewise” at the end of the story of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:37) literally obligates us to pour oil and wine on the wounds of half-dead victims of robbery on the Jericho road today, setting them on donkeys (not in cars) and paying for their stay at roadside inns with (literal) denarii. Critical ridicule which is blind to this feature of Biblical interpretation in general is too superficial and inconsistent to warrant serious attention.
The important point, that Corcoran does not address in his piece, is that this “general equity” ought to be applied in adjudication not legislation. I do not stake my case on whether Bahnsen made that claim, but I believe he should have.
In the past, I (by default) embraced the idea of the human legislative branch. The post-war (i.e., war for independence) and post-constitution consensus among Americans has been that man should be creating new laws every year. John Locke called legislative power “the supreme power of the commonwealth…sacred and unalterable in the hands where the community have once placed it.” As I studied the Bible, however, I began to have some uneasiness about man’s legislation. For example, in 2014, I wrote the following:
The question for the Church is this: What will we do when this system crumbles? To whom will we flee for help? Will we try to implement another humanistic, anti-Christ system of “natural law”? Or will we finally see the goodness and beauty and justice of God’s Law?
However, I still hadn’t fully addressed the post-war/post-constitution consensus that man needs to make new laws in order to establish justice. I tended to agree with the following words from a sermon delivered by Stephen Langdon in 1788:
Let not men openly irreligious and immoral become your legislators; for how can you expect good laws to be made by men who have no fear of God before their eyes, and who boldly trample on the authority of His commands?
I supposed that we could at least make “good laws,” if we tried hard enough. (However, looking back, I cannot recall a human law that I thought we needed for justice.) Years later, in 2021, as I was writing Vote Christian, I was challenged by Luke Saint regarding the assumption that we need Christian legislators. We don’t need legislators at all, Saint counselled, given that we have the legislation of God in Scripture.
A Case-in-Point (Doug Wilson)
Corcoran is correct to cite Doug Wilson as an example of a “general equity theonomist” who demonstrates a substantial convergence with Christian Nationalists “on practical applications, including the role of civil magistrates.” His article asserts that Wilson’s general conception of “general equity” is not that different than Wolfe’s understanding of the abiding guidance offered by Mosaic law. I’ll grant Corcoran that point. My concern is that Wilson is not far from Wolfe’s view precisely because he (Wilson) accepts man-made legislation. For Corcoran, this is (apparently) not a problem. It is for me.
For a practical example, Wilson has (fairly recently) argued for the enactment of drug laws and punishments for people who possess “illegal” substances. This might be consistent with Christian Nationalism, but it is not consistent with the Bible, which does not authorize man to create new standards of justice (i.e., new laws) regarding what substances a man may possess in the course of taking dominion.
‘Minor’ Differences?
I think Corcoran’s conception of what constitutes a “minor” difference between Wolfe and Rushdoony is questionable. For example, after addressing epistemological differences, Corcoran gives the example of public (government) schooling. Corcoran writes, “Wolfe’s position on public schooling assumes that it could be redeemed under a Christian society. Contrast this with Rushdoony who argues that public schooling inherently violates biblical principles by usurping parental authority.” He then contrasts quotes from Wolfe and Rushdoony:
Wolfe: “Public schooling is bad only because the public is not Christian. If the public were Christian, public schooling would be good and right.”
Rushdoony: “State control of education has been a central means of destroying Christian order…The education of children is a God-given responsibility of parents, not the state.”
I would hardly call government-controlled education versus parental/private education a minor difference. One (i.e., public school) is funded via forced taxation (which carries with it punishments for those who do not pay up) and has led to various compulsory education laws (and jailtime for some parents). The other (i.e., the biblical view of education) contains no such injustices. If Wolfe opposes those aspects of public education, then whatever he is promoting is not government-controlled (public) education as we know it and would probably be closer to private or church-based education funded via voluntary contributions. The point, however, is that a nearly $1-trillion-dollar-a-year endeavor funded via theft (forced taxation) cannot be considered “minor” in any sense of the word, and Corcoran does not explain what Wolfe actually believes about these essential components of modern public schooling.
Brief Comments on Corcoran’s Eleven ‘Points of Agreement’
Corcoran quickly moves on from the abovementioned “minor” differences between Wolfe and Rushdoony and then states: “Far more worthy of our attention is the astounding amount of agreement both authors seem to have.” Corcoran outlines eleven points of agreement “between Wolfe and Rushdoony, whose works serve as adequate representations of their respective political theories.” I do not think the points warrant an in-depth analysis. They are rather surface level assertions that provide little substance for practical purposes. I will address three of them to demonstrate my point. Then, given that Corcoran references Wolfe’s The Case for Christian Nationalism, I will follow suite, but will show how there is a serious divergence, rather than convergence, between Wolfe’s articulation of Christian Nationalism and theonomy.
What Constitutes Tyranny. Concerning tyranny, Corcoran writes, “Both authors [Wolfe and Rushdoony] describe tyranny as arising from regimes that reject God’s authority and impose secular or anti-Christian norms.” Yes, both Wolfe and Rushdoony, generally speaking, might describe tyranny in similar ways, but the crux of the matter is found in the application. If Wolfe believes God has granted the “state” the authority to punish you for not funding public education, and Rushdoony does not, I hardly call that a minor practical difference. The former leads to godly men being sent to jail; the latter leaves the righteous free to use their money for godly purposes. This first of Corcoran’s “points of agreement” is superficial, at best. I think almost every Christian thinker (even an Anabaptist) could sign-off on such a broad statement: “Tyranny arises from regimes that reject God’s authority and impose secular or anti-Christian norms.” The statement should be a given for Christendom, something akin to the “milk” referenced in Hebrews 5:13 – it is good and true, but we need to move forward and build on this foundation.
No Neutrality in the Public Square. Corcoran writes, “Both deny neutrality in governance and argue for explicitly Christian principles in public life.” Once again, this is correct, so far as it goes, but is not overly helpful. There are many Christians who are neither Christian Nationalists nor theonomists who would affirm this. The question is this: What explicitly Christian principles should we argue for? How about the principle that God requires us to adjudicate based on his legislation, not our own laws?
Negative Law and Civil Legislation. Corcorcan claims that both Wolfe and Rushdoony “emphasize that biblical law operates primarily through prohibitions rather than positive mandates.” On the surface this might be the case, but as will be explained below, Wolfe gives wide latitude for positive mandates from the civil magistrate. Corcoran quotes Rushdoony as describing “a negative concept of law” as one that “deals realistically with…a particular evil directly and plainly.” This is consistent with the biblical (and theonomic) claim that magistrates are “to punish those who do evil” (1 Pet. 2:14). But Wolfe argues that laws should be enacted, not simply to deal with a particular evil, but to “secure and support the people’s particularity, encourage their pride of place, and reinforce one’s duties to this country” (p. 264). That is a far cry from negative law. (More will be said on Wolfe’s view of legislation below.)
Three Substantive Points of Divergence
In what follows, I list three substantive points of divergence between Christian Nationalism (and any adjacent political theories) and theonomy. More points could be given, but for the sake of keeping the length of this article equal to or less than Corcoran’s initial article, I will give an abbreviated list.
1. The Supreme Power to Make Law
Wolfe, in lockstep with the post-war/post-constitution consensus regarding the Lockean vision of man-made legislation, embraces the nearly incessant creation of new laws to “order” society for the “common good.” Wolfe argues that the magistrate (“prince”) is to ponder the natural law and then create “human law” (The Case for Christian Nationalism, p. 290). As stressed above, this process of legislating is not identical to adjudication. For Wolfe, the role of the prince is not simply to render judgment and establish justice, but to order the lives of his people and create new legislation. It appears that Wolfe comes close to addressing adjudication at one point, but he then commits a category error and reverts to legislation: “[The prince] makes public judgments in application of God’s natural law, effectively creating law (though derivative of natural law), and he has the power to bring about what he commands” (p. 286). Contra Wolfe, I submit that the theonomic/biblical position is as follows: The prince renders public judgment on specific cases by appealing to God’s inscripturated legislation. There is a major divergence between those two statements – theologically, philosophically, and practically.
Wolfe argues that people need to “enact their own laws” (p. 264), implying that justice cannot be established without (constantly?) creating new laws. Man – either in the form of the “Christian prince” or an “elected assembly” – is thus free to create new laws, appealing to philosophy and natural principles so that “natural law becomes human law” (p. 290). This new legislation then, in the words of Wolfe, “binds the conscience to just applications of natural law” (p. 290).
Theonomy rejects the claim that man has been given power to create new legislation. Man does need, in the words of Wolfe, “strength, resolve, and spirit,” but not to enact their own laws, but rather to render judgment (2 Chron. 19:6) and to judge the people (1 Kings 3:9). We are to refer to the standard of God’s legislation in rendering judgment on cases.
2. The Civil Magistrate as One Who ‘Orders’ Our Affairs
Bahnsen believed that “perhaps the most damaging oversight in contemporary evangelical thinking about the ethics of life-in-community” was the failure to draw “a distinction between social ethics (in general) and political ethics (in particular)” (God and Politics, p. 42). This is the exact oversight prevalent in Wolfe’s Christian Nationalism.
Bahnsen explained:
Those with conservative leanings have tended to promote ethically commendable goals (sobriety regarding alcoholic beverages, restriction of smoking tobacco, intervention to curtail the geopolitical spread of communism) by less than ethical means, calling upon the state to exercise its power of compulsion where no biblical warrant for it can be cogently adduced…No matter how ethically good these various projects may be, attempting to get the civil authorities to enforce them without warrant from God’s Word is to capitulate to the unprincipled position of Thrasymachus, who taught that what counts as “justice” is simply whatever happens to be in the interest of the stronger faction in society. (God and Politics, p. 43-44)
The “Thrasymachian” position Bahnsen warned of is precisely the position Wolfe advocates for in The Case for Christian Nationalism. Despite some general statements against tyranny and overregulation, Wolfe believes there is “much…for civil law to order in our lives” (p. 250). Wolfe seems to merge establishing justice and ordering society. In fact, Wolfe believes the fundamental role of civil government is to be the “ordering agent of civil society” (p. 72). It exists to reconcile “the diverse interests of families and vocations in order to establish and maintain civil peace” (p. 72).
Wolfe goes so far as to argue that the civil government can essentially enact any law that will “direct [the people] to true religion and its principal site for the administration of spiritual good (viz., the instituted church)” (p, 187). This leads to Wolfe’s conclusion that the Christian prince can enact laws requiring church attendance (p. 395) and regulating the height of the pulpit in the sanctuary (p. 317). It should not surprise us, then, when Wolfe argues that the civil magistrate can also subject the church to “emergency orders in the case of extraordinary circumstances” (p. 304). State governors looking for justification for issuing shutdown orders to churches in 2020 need look no further than Wolfe’s The Case for Christian Nationalism.
An important point of clarification: I do not believe that the problems of group interests and the ordering of social affairs are unimportant. They are important and require leadership, wisdom, and united efforts to solve. However, it does not follow from this affirmation that man-made legislation is the solution. If opponents of (non-legislative) theonomy would understand this one point, much progress could be made in this discussion. For example, when it comes to immigration, non-legislative theonomists do not desire that evil people move into our land. However, we believe the biblical option, which does not include legislation prohibiting crossing a national boundary, to be the superior option. In other words, if we follow God’s legislation, we will do far more to keep evil people out of our land than if we create and (attempt to) enforce man-made immigration legislation.
Furthermore, social customs are extremely important but are not directly linked to a Christian political theory. Cultural Christianity and social customs are integral to the health of any people, but it does not follow that civil rulers are responsible for such customs. For example, contra Wolfe, I argue that architectural achievements should not be the purview of civil rulers acting as civil rulers (i.e., wielding the sword; cf. Rom. 13:4). These cultural achievements should be the result of leadership in the “public” sector, perhaps influenced by civil rulers, but without the force of the sword, as it were. These are not matters of justice.
Wolfe recently tweeted: “There is no principled argument against the state having the authority to apprehend illegals in a church context.” This comment reinforces Wolfe’s underlying theological and philosophical starting point concerning the magistrate. A theonomist would look to Scripture to ascertain if crossing a border is a violation a God’s legislation (and if it carries with it a civil penalty in the Bible). Since God’s legislation does not forbid travel, a magistrate is limited (in terms of using the sword) to rendering a judgment on a case brought before him regarding a migrant who has violated God’s legislation. The creation of a man-made law regarding travel is not justified. But a Wolfian Christian Nationalist does not need to consult God’s Word because the principles of the “common good” or “public interest” are sufficient to justify statist agents coming into a church and arresting parishioners.
In discussing the idea of the role of the civil magistrate, we are discussing the form of civil government. Wolfe argues natural law can give us the best form of government for our nation. I argue, conversely, that the Bible gives us a form of civil government we ought to embrace. Wolfe’s Christian Nationalism is hardly the only alternative to secularism, and I contend it is not the most desirable. I propose that non-legislative theonomy is the form of government God has given us – the only form that facilities the good works of loving neighbor and establishing justice in society.
3. The Obscurity of Justice Within the Man-Made System
Perhaps most disturbing is Wolfe’s insistence that understanding justice is a Herculean task, and only the wise and benevolent legislators are competent. Wolfe argues that “private persons cannot determine many of the actions necessary for the common good” and they ought to obey human legislation even if they do “not know the reasons for the action” (p. 252). The human lawgiver is charged with making “judgements for the whole” and us peons should presume that there is a good reason for the latest man-made law. (Does that remind you of the arguments used during Covid lockdowns?)
Wolfe does admit that we are “not helpless, amoral, non-rational beings, unable ever to judge the substance and consequences of our actions” (p. 253). Therefore, he leaves the door open just a crack for defying man-made law. However, he is emphatic that there is an “inherent difficulty in determining whether a law is unjust” (p. 274). The civil authorities are “typically in a better position than private persons to make judgments about what serves the common good” (p. 274). Even pastors, Wolfe declares, are “no more competent to analyze or make civil law than any other private person” (p. 275). Contrast Wolfe’s claim with the claims of the Psalmist: “I will also speak of your testimonies before kings and shall not be put to shame…I understand more than the aged, for I keep your precepts” (Ps. 119:46, 100). Proverbs 28:5 teaches us that “evil men do not understand justice, but those who seek the Lord understand it completely.” According to Wolfe’s logic, we might want to rephrase that to, “The hoi polloi do not understand justice, but career politicians understand it completely.”
Wolfe claims that “every civil law is binding only if it is derived from God’s law” (p. 269) but then asserts that it is very hard for us common folk to understand if a law is just. In the end, Wolfe would have a hard time (consistently) arguing against a law stating that you cannot wear foreign denim because such a law is for the common good, supports the “people’s particularity,” and encourages their “pride of place.”
Just as wisdom is justified in her children, so too is any philosophical system justified in its practical application. The three aforementioned implications of Wolfe’s philosophy should give us pause.
Conclusion
Corcoran concludes that the “perceived divide between Christian Reconstructionism and Christian Nationalism is more rhetorical than substantive.” He elaborates:
Both frameworks affirm the supremacy of God’s law, the enduring validity of biblical principles, and the necessity of applying them to civil governance. They reject secular neutrality and share a vision for a society ordered under Christ’s lordship, providing a compelling alternative to the moral relativism of secular systems.
But this does not tell us much, other than giving us the starting point to begin the work of applying the Bible to the civil realm. Starting points are good, but the divergences between Wolfe’s position and theonomy come early and often. Minimizing these divergences is like minimizing any doctrinal difference by saying, “But we all agree that God’s Word is supreme, biblical principles are valid, and we must apply them to all of life.” If Wolfe’s The Case for Christian Nationalism was simply a defense of those general claims, I would have little to gainsay. If the book was merely a philosophical-historical defense of the general idea that “all of life, including public life, ought to be Christian” (p. 7), then I would feel little need to critique it. But Wolfe goes further. He applies his ideas to the nitty-gritty of civil life (e.g., civil laws). The chili meets the cheese when Wolfe explains his definition and how it is applied in the real world. The problem is aptly summarized by Bahnsen, who warned of those who base their civil-ethical system on “autonomous philosophical speculation or the social traditions of men” rather than “the infallible Word of God in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments.”
At the end of his article, Corcoran summarizes his thesis:
Moreover, both traditions converge on practical applications, including the role of civil magistrates, the necessity of explicitly Christian laws, and the rejection of pluralistic neutrality. They agree that all societies are inherently religious and that civil rulers must reflect God’s justice in their legal systems. This shared vision presents an opportunity for unity among Christians committed to rebuilding a godly social order.
If Corcoran’s plea is that we need to continue the conversation, then I concur. If, however, he supposes the practical differences are largely irrelevant, I must demur. What biblical principles do Christian Nationalists and theonomists agree are still valid? How about the biblical principle that the magistrate (prince/ruler/king) is to be about the business of rendering judgments rather than creating new laws? Let’s start with the “general equity” of that biblical principle. If we have fundamental divergences concerning what the biblical principles are, how can we say that we are basically on the same page? Hence, I argue this is primarily an exegetical issue: What does the Bible teach about justice in the civil realm?
Paul’s injunction to Timothy applies to us: “Do your best to present yourself to God as one approved, a worker who has no need to be ashamed, rightly handling the word of truth” (2 Tim. 2:15). We must study Scripture to answer these fundamental questions related to the role of the magistrate and the meaning of justice in the civil realm. However, many Christian Nationalists reject that out-of-hand and claim that the Bible does not address these matters.
As I have demonstrated above, Christian Nationalism and theonomy do not converge on the role of the civil magistrate. The former posits that the magistrate can wield the sword to order society and direct our affairs, including your church’s pulpit height. The latter posits that the magistrate can only wield the sword to punish evildoers according to God’s inscripurated legislation. Nor do they converge on the need to create explicitly Christian laws. The former embraces Locke’s vision of man-made law; the latter accepts God’s legislation as all the legislation we need. Finally, there is also serious divergence in terms of the ability of the “common man” to understand justice. These are massive, substantive divergences related to the weighty matter of justice. Minimizing these differences will do little to help Christians mature and establish justice.
