Last month, I responded to Nolan Corcoran’s article on political theory. This month, Corcoran joined me for a nearly four-hour informal debate on theonomy on The Lancaster Patriot Podcast, much of which ended up focusing on legal precedent. I appreciate Corcoran’s willingness to interact and civilly disagree.
Prior to our interaction, Corcoran posted a syllogism in a Facebook group wherein he argued against the position of non-legislative theonomy. I waited to respond to that syllogism until now because I did not fully understand the presuppositions behind his premises, conclusion, and then his further conclusion based on the formal conclusion. Now, after speaking with Corcoran for over three hours, I am better prepared to respond to both his syllogism and some of the comments he made during our podcast interaction. In the spirit of continuing the discussion in a civil and respectful manner, I offer this article.
In the aforementioned Facebook post, Corcoran opens with the following (all Corcoran quotes will be in bold and italics): “NLT hinges on Deut. 4:2 forbidding any legislation outside of the Mosaic Law whatsoever.”
In response, I would begin by noting that as with most doctrines, non-legislative theonomy (a.k.a. Lancastrian theonomy) does not hinge on any single verse. If Deuteronomy 4:2 does not forbid creating civil legislation, there are countless other passages and prescriptions in Scripture that support the thesis of non-legislative theonomy (many of these passages are referenced in Luke Saint’s book and my book). At its core, non-legislative theonomy posits that the structure of civil justice that God prescribes in Scripture is normative. That is, a system of judges/magistrates adjudicating cases brought by accusers by referring to (1) the facts of the case and (2) God’s revelation in sacred Scripture. The idea that a previous ruling between a man and his neighbor is legally or logically necessary for another case between another man and his neighbor is not an aspect of this system (more on this concept of “legal precedent” at the end of the article). Corcoran denies the normative nature of the biblical system of justice, arguing that if the Bible does not forbid the creation of tax enforcers, police officers, zoning officers, drug officers, etc., then we are free to create such offices (ostensibly funded via forced taxation – another aspect not found in God’s prescribed civil structure).
The biblically prescribed system of civil justice in Scripture does not include a civil legislative function. Even the kings were to study and rule by referring to the civil legislation given by God (cf. Deut. 17:18-20). In many ways, the system of non-legislative theonomy is similar (I do not say identical) to the common law system. “Common law functions as an adversarial system, a contest between two opposing parties before a judge who moderates” (The Robbins Collection, “The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions”). I assert that the standard of justice in God’s system remains the legislation God gave us (found from Genesis to Revelation). Each contest brought before a judge is unique – no two cases are ever the exact same – and each case must be adjudicated by referring to the facts of that case and sacred Scripture. There is nothing legally binding from a previous case on this new case because they are not the same case. A biblical judge makes a ruling between a specific man and his neighbor regarding what is to happen to those men – that is the extent of his function.
During our interaction on the podcast, many of Corcoran’s claims were couched in a non-adversarial system. For example, he posited that it would be acceptable for a civil magistrate to task agents with observing potentially dangerous behaviors (e.g., “speeding” or possessing a substance in your cupboard) and then issuing penalties, fines, and punishments. This concept is foreign to the biblical text. It is only familiar to us because we are steeped in a statist system with “law enforcement” officers, zoning officers, food departments, education departments, etc. An adversarial system of justice, on the other hand, does not contain such “enforcement officers.” There was no parapet officer who would walk around Israel and bring charges against people because of what he did not see on their rooftops.
It seemed to me that Corcoran’s remonstration against this claim was something along the lines of, “But the Bible never forbids us from having law enforcement officers who punish people preemptively, therefore it is allowed.” This reveals a fundamental divergence between our positions. I assert that the system of justice revealed in the Bible is normative and there must be an express warrant from Scripture for the magistrate to use the sword. Corcoran rejects this position. Because Corcoran does not see a passage that says, “You shall not issue fines to people who have not yet wronged anyone, but who could potentially do so,” he then concludes that it is acceptable for a system of law enforcement officers observing our behaviors to see if we are doing anything that could “potentially” be dangerous. This is essential to consider, especially as the practical application of Corcoran’s position has proven disastrous in human history, and specifically in modern America (see my book, Seven Statist Sins). W. W. Turner provides an example of what happens when the magistrate is tasked with determining what things could potentially be “dangerous,” rather than simply responding to cases brought to them by adjudicating:
Two people could have walked down any U.S. street in 1930 – one with a bottle of whiskey under his arm and one with a bar of gold in his pocket, and the one with the whiskey would have been a criminal whereas the one with the bar of gold would have been considered a good law abiding citizen. If the same thing happened in a U.S. city in 1970, the one with the whiskey would be the law-abiding citizen and the one with the gold bar would be the criminal. (The Amazing Story of the British Sovereign)
The legislators in the 1930s concluded that allowing people to possess whiskey would be “dangerous” to society and therefore outlawed it, while “allowing” the people to still possess a bar of gold. Then the legislators decided it would be “dangerous” to the economy to allow people to possess gold – so possession of gold was outlawed, whereas whiskey possession was allowed. Today, it is illegal to possess certain substances that the righteous should be free to use to take dominion of this earth. The practical application of Corcoran’s position is more such laws and regulations – rules which will change from generation to generation – that punish people even though they have not violated any of God’s laws. (When I asked Corcoran how I was failing to love my neighbor by possessing an “illicit” substance in my cupboard, I believe he was unable to give a substantial answer – but you can judge for yourself if you listen to the podcast interaction.)
“They reject the traditional, proper exegesis that said verse applies to God’s universal moral Law and that theonomic civil legislation does not amount to ‘adding to the Law’ but ‘applying’ the Law.”
Corcoran is correct to note that non-legislative theonomists classify new civil legislation as adding to God’s laws, however if I understood him correctly during our interaction, Corcoran agreed that we can make a distinction between non-civil “legislation” (i.e., evils committed that the magistrate is not authorized to use the sword against – Corcoran gave the example of lying to his wife) and civil legislation in the Bible (i.e., evils committed that the magistrate is authorized to use the sword against). To Corcoran, “legislation” broadly considered is any command in the Bible (whether the magistrate is authorized to punish infractions against it or not) – e.g., do not covet, be joyful, be patient, etc. Generally speaking, when I (and perhaps most non-legislative theonomists) use the term “legislation” in the context of discussion about social or “political” ethics we are not referring broadly to all of God’s Law-Word (commands like love your wife, instruct your children, rejoice in tribulation, etc.), but to “civil legislation” as I have defined it above – namely, a command that carries with it a penal sanction from the magistrate (e.g., execution, restitution). Corcoran affirmed that this is a valid distinction that we can ascertain by studying the Bible. For the remainder of this post, I will use the full phrase “civil legislation” for clarity.
Corcoran asserts that civil legislation is not “adding to the Law” but “applying the Law.” This, however, is the point in contention. Because he simply assumes this assertion, the syllogism he then posits is irrelevant to the thesis that we cannot create civil legislation. His syllogism “proves” something, but not related to the claim of non-legislative theonomists regarding civil legislation. Nevertheless, I will interact with it.
I assert that “applying” the Law is legitimate and occurs not only in civil adjudication (which occurs in various places in the Bible; cf. Lev. 19:15-16; Deut. 13:14; 16:18-20; 25:1-3; 2 Chron. 19:5; Jer. 7:5-6; Job 29), but also in other contexts. For example, I could “apply the law” to honor my mother in my personal life by fixing her kitchen sink when she is old.
Even though Corcoran wrote that non-legislative theonomists “reject the traditional, proper exegesis that said verse applies to God’s universal moral Law,” Corcoran actually affirmed on the podcast that, according to his position, Deuteronomy 4:2 not only forbade adding to the “universal moral law,” but it also forbade the Israelites from adding to the civil legislation God gave. Non-legislative theonomists do not reject that Deuteronomy 4:2 can be applied to God’s moral law, but we assert it at least refers to the specific statutes given by Moses, including the civil legislation. Corcoran agrees with this, so this statement is not helpful.
Importantly, Corcoran contends that the prohibition against adding to the moral law still applies, but the prohibition against adding to civil legislation was abrogated, not with the end of the Old Covenant, but with the installation of the first king (Saul). I reject that assertion and note that the king was required to make a copy of the laws God gave (statutes/commandments) and nowhere is there an authorization for him to create new civil legislation. In fact, the abuses Samual warned about regarding a new king might have included the result of a king creating new civil legislation – but such a reality does not endorse the practice any more than Samuel’s declaration of the abuses of the coming kings endorses said abuses.
Because Corcoran affirmed that Deuteronomy 4:2 forbade man from adding to the civil legislation God gave the people, I asked him where in Scripture we see this prohibition being lifted. Even though I asked him multiple times (for example, see 3:13:45 in the podcast), Corcoran could not give a passage where such a prohibition was lifted. Instead, he said it was “the very nature of legislation according to different particular body politics” (3:17:10). He will forgive us “biblicists” for wanting biblical argumentation for such a change. God is obviously capable of explicitly explaining any changes to his covenant requirements for people (see the book of Hebrews). Corcoran and I both agree that civil legislation was not the purview of man under the judges (prior to Saul’s kingship). I assert that it is still not the purview of man. The burden of proof is on Corcoran to show us where in the Bible this has changed.
I would also note that during our interaction I pressed Corcoran on the point that given that he agreed that the statutes given to Israel were sufficient at least for that time, and given that they did not cover all the particulars, we can conclude that a judge was expected to use the statutes (which he was not authorized to add to) as the standard for justice when he considered a case. Such rulings (between a man and his neighbor) could apply the God-given statutes to various real-world cases. Such is the case today – a godly judge can apply the God-given statutes in the Bible to a specific case brought to him.
“They argue that no distinctions (universal vs particular, moral vs civil) in the Law are made in this verse and cannot thus be made. With that in mind, a simple syllogism refutes this position.”
I am not sure what Corcoran is getting at here. The natural law position is that the moral law is universal and abiding (summarized in the Ten Commandments) and the civil law is contained in the statutes given for Israel (now abrogated). Corcoran affirmed that Deuteronomy 4:2 forbade men from adding to both (moral and civil). Given that, the burden of proof is on Corcoran to show where in the Bible the prohibition is lifted on adding to the civil law, whereas the prohibition against adding to the moral law remains. Distinctions within the law are made in the Bible. For example, Isaiah 1 reveals a clear differentiation between following the ceremonial law and following laws related to justice. Be that as it may, man is not authorized to make any changes, not even to the ceremonial law. Only God can do that – and he did just that (see the book of Hebrews).
With all this in mind, let us now turn to Corcoran’s syllogism.
P1: Sin is defined as transgression against God’s Law (cf. 1 Jn. 3:4; Rom. 7:7; Rom. 3:20; Lev. 5:17)
P2: If workers of the gospel (e.g. pastors) request payment for their service and you refuse—violating the command to not muzzle your ox—this is sin. (1 Cor. 9:1-14)
I am generally fine with both premises. We might quibble about pastors “requesting payment,” if that assumes they are able to dictate when and how much they receive. But I concur that it is a sin to reject what God says about renumerating pastors.
C1: Therefore, to pay workers of the gospel (e.g. pastors) who request payment for their service is the Law.
Discounting the “request” payment language, let’s still address this general conclusion. Corcoran’s use of the phrase “is the Law” might be an attempt to carry in several presuppositions, but once again, on the surface, I agree. Given that the command to pay workers of the gospel is given by the Holy Spirit, it is a command from God.
If the premises are true, then the conclusion follows necessarily. And if the conclusion be true, then Paul here is legislating Law by way of applying God’s universal Law. Not by creating new Law. Therefore, to legislate particular laws by applying God’s universal Law is Biblically normative and thus divinely sanctioned.”
Here is where Corcoran makes his Herculean jump. His syllogism only establishes that a command from the Holy Spirit can properly be considered a law of God. When Corcoran states “if the conclusion be true, then Paul here is legislating Law by way of applying God’s universal Law,” he makes several jumps and assumptions that are not necessarily contained in, or required by, his syllogism.
First of all, in 1 Corinthians 9, Paul appears to be applying a specific statute (Deut. 25:4). (Does Corcoran classify Deuteronomy 25:4 as a universal moral law or a particular statute? I think Corcoran would say that Paul is applying the moral law that is behind the specific statute of Deuteronomy 25:4.) Paul is making an application of the law that God gave requiring providing for laboring animals (Deut. 25:4). Paul is making an application of the law of God, and he is doing so infallibly (which can be assumed given our presuppositions as Protestant Christians that the Bible, including the epistles, is God’s Word).
Corcoran simply asserts that Paul is legislating Law “by way of applying God’s universal Law.” Again, given that Paul’s words are contained in sacred Scripture, we can certainly refer to them as part of God’s Law-Word, generally speaking.
The Law (in the Old Testament) requires that workers (animals or otherwise) be compensated accordingly. Paul correctly applies this to the New Covenant office of pastor. I think I am comfortable arguing one of two positions: (1) That the sin is violating the general equity of the law God gave in Deuteronomy, or (2) the sin is violating a new statute given by the Holy Spirit. Neither of those positions undermine the position of non-legislative theonomy.
Moreover, Paul is explicit that he is explaining the meaning of the law when he notes, “Do I say these things on human authority? Does not the Law say the same?” (1 Cor. 9:8). We can say his application was “new” only in the sense that New Testament pastors did not exist in the Old Testament. In 1 Timothy, Paul makes a similar argument: “Let the elders who rule well be considered worthy of double honor, especially those who labor in preaching and teaching. For the Scripture says, ‘You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain,’ and, ‘The laborer deserves his wages'” (1 Tim. 5:17-18). We see that Paul actually appeals to more than one law to make his case.
Corcoran is incorrect, or imprecise, when he says that if his conclusion is true, “then Paul here is legislating Law by way of applying God’s universal Law.” If anything, this specific example lends support that we can only make application of God’s law to specific cases. Once again, however, none of this is particularly relevant to whether we need new standards for justice when adjudicating a case in order to establish justice. If justice can be established by a judge with the facts of the case and the Bible (Genesis to Revelation), there is simply no need for new civil legislation. Thus far, I have yet to hear any opponent of our position deny that justice can be established in court with a judge examining the facts and using the Bible as his standard of justice. On the other hand, I have heard them say things like it is a sin to drive over the speed limit or posses a substance. Statism runs deep.
Note again that this syllogism only proves that the Holy Spirit can issue authoritative commands: whether as “applications” of previously given statutes, or as explanations of the Law (“Does not the Law say the same?) or as “new” statutes. The syllogism does not undermine any of the central claims of Lancastrian theonomy.
The potential objections Corcoran posits below are not ones I would have made, but I will briefly comment on them, nonetheless, and make some final comments on his syllogism.
Objections Answered:
1. If you provide a condition to the command (e.g. if they request payment) then it is no longer a Law.
⇒ Answer: This does not deny either of the premises and so does not affect the conclusion at all. The error here is to suppose that conditions—or context—does anything to the universal nature of a command. Whether or not man is permitted to take another’s life is conditional.
This is not an objection I would raise. This is not relevant to the question of whether man should be able to create new civil legislation.
2. This may be the Law but it is not a civil Law, carrying with it some form of punishment.
⇒ Answer: This may be true but such an objection contradicts the aforementioned presupposition concerning the invalidity of making distinctions in the Law in our interpretation of Deut. 4:2.
Corcoran again presumes the invalidity of making distinctions in Law in our interpretation of Deuteronomy 4:2, and yet Corcoran himself makes distinctions when he affirmed (on the podcast) that there are universals and particulars in the Law, and Deuteronomy 4:2 forbade the Israelites at the time from adding to both the moral law and the civil statutes, but it did not forbid the future kings from adding to the civil statutes. Corcoran contends the prohibition against adding to the moral law remains, but the latter prohibition against adding civil statutes was abrogated with the first king.
It is logically possible and consistent with the non-legislative theonomic framework to assert that Paul was not creating a new law at all but giving a Holy Spirit-inspired application of the statute from Deuteronomy. On the other hand, it could be argued that God was giving new laws related to the New Covenant church – and God has the prerogative to give new laws. Neither of these possibilities invalidate the claim that man is not to create new moral laws or new civil laws/legislation. The syllogism is simply irrelevant to this issue.
Corcoran affirms that it “may be true” that Paul’s command did not carry with it a civil penalty. However, this too is irrelevant. The Holy Spirit, via Paul’s writing, could have attached a civil penalty if he so desired. But neither would this contradict the non-legislative theonomic position that man is not to create new laws (moral or civil or ceremonial). The biblical text in the New Testament carries with it the same authority as the Old Testament. If an argument is going to be made against the non-legislative theonomic position, it cannot be made by pointing to God giving laws/commands/statutes. Therefore, using the Holy Spirit’s application of the law in Deuteronomy 25:4 (even if we grant it is a new law), in no way undermines the non-legislative theonomic position.
3. The Law of God only constitutes commands which carry with it some form civil punishment for violation, thus Deut. 4:2 only pertains to such civil laws.
⇒ Answer: This is self refuting. As Deut. 4:2 does not itself have an attached civil punishment. Moreover, the 10th Commandment does not have any direct civil punishment attached to it.”
No theonomist makes the claim that the Law of God only constitutes commands which carry with it some form of civil punishment. We affirm many do not – for example, the command to stand up before the gray head (Lev. 19:32), the command to be constant in prayer (Rom. 12:12), etc. We also affirm that some commands do carry with them a civil punishment (e.g., murder, theft, kidnapping, etc.) – and we insist that violations of those commands and those commands only are the ones a magistrate can punish by the force of the sword (see Romans 13:4). Corcoran’s third potential objection is irrelevant and no theonomist would make it in response to the application Corcoran makes from his syllogism’s conclusion.
In conclusion, Corcoran’s syllogism only proves that Paul was writing under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit and any commands he consequently gave in the inspired text of the Bible are to be considered commands from God. If the non-legislative theonomic position is to be undermined, another argument will need to be raised.
A Word on Legal Precedent
As something of a postscript to this post, I’d like to make a few more comments about Corcoran’s statements about legal precedent. During our podcast interaction, Corcoran was trying to establish that a judge’s reasoning in a ruling (not the ruling itself) becomes “legal precedent.” Keep in mind that according to the biblical system of justice a judge rules in a specific case and his ruling is in regard to that specific case – e.g., John must make restitution to Joe. The judge’s ruling does not establish a legally binding precedent regarding similar cases.
Corcoran’s conception of legal precedent might be perfectly coherent within our American system, which does indeed align with much of Corcoran’s argumentation – but I am not arguing for the American system, and Corcoran’s assertions that you must accept legal precedent in our current system is irrelevant to if it has a legal or practical import in a biblical system. I think we continued to talk past each other because Corcoran’s conception of civil justice is so couched in terms of our American legal system that he could not separate himself from it. The biblical system of justice does not include judges ruling on other rulings and issuing opinions on the legitimacy of laws and so forth. None of those things are germane to a biblical system of justice, because a biblical system of justice focuses on an accuser bringing a charge before a judge. Corcoran’s syllogisms and theoretical argumentation notwithstanding, in biblical law there is simply not a body of law enforcers to punish people who have not been accused (and had a trial with witnesses, etc.) based on the opinion of a judge in some previous ruling between another man and his neighbor. I maintain that legal precedent, as Corcoran defines it and as it is understood in the American system, is neither a necessary component for justice, nor an aspect of God’s system of civil justice.
God’s system requires judges who fear God, are trustworthy, and hate bribes. As the Psalmist declared, “I have more understanding than all my teachers, for your testimonies are my meditation.” This is the kind of understanding we need. No one needs to comprehend the intricacies of legal precedent to grasp the concept of justice. Aside from describing how our American court system functions, I don’t believe that the arguments presented by Corcoran are particularly relevant to the pursuit of true justice. No magistrate needs to meditate on or even consider these points. I think many Christians would not even follow Corcoran’s argumentation regarding legal precent, but they can understand justice (cf. Prov. 25:8).
